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ROBERT J. PATRICK*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The year 1975 and the actions of the present Congress may determine the course of U.S. international tax policy for some years to
come. Policy makers have increasingly used fiscal measures as a tool
to achieve economic objectives. It is not surprising, therefore, that our
tax structure is perceived by some as a basic factor in determining
the allocation of investment resources between the United States and
foreign countries. As recently as April 17, Congressman Vanick, a
member of the Ways and Means Committee, expressed his concern
over the influence of the tax factors on investments:
Through piecemeal legislative changes stretching over 30 years, the
Congress has constructed a "tilt" of our tax laws toward foreign investment and away from domestic investment. As Senator Church has documented in his own investigation of this matter, the tax code currently
provides quite strong incentives for an American company to invest
abroad. These artificial tax incentives often override substantive economic criteria in a businessman's decision to expand his foreign operations.
In other words, a company may decide to build a manufacturing
plant in Europe not because the profit potential alone is more attractive
in a foreign plant than it would be with a similar plant built in the United
States. Rather, the businessman makes his decision to invest abroad
because he knows that profits from his foreign plant will escape substantially or completely U.S. tax.
The implications of this bias in our tax laws are enormous. The basic
health and strength of our economy is being slowly drained [and] with
the continued tax-induced outflow of investment dollars from the United
States American jobs are lost. American business suffers from a shortage
of capital. And we have no one to blame but ourselves.,

*International Tax Counsel, U.S. Treasury Department; LL.B. Stanford; B.A.
Stanford.
1. 121 Congressional Record H. 2944 (April 17, 1975) (remarks of Congressman
Vanick).
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For the reasons I shall develop in this paper, I believe that this
emphasis on the relative influence of our tax rules on investment
decisions is misplaced.
It is often difficult to find objective analysis in this area, let alone
persuasive data on which to base conclusions. Different theories of
tax neutrality have been formulated 2 and policy arguments are built
around tenaciously held beliefs in these theories.
Moreover, analysis may be influenced by reactions to the facts
that multinational enterprises have the ability to shift resources and
operations to obtain tax and other advantages; that costs in the form
of royalties or rents have been restructured as foreign income taxes
to be offset against U.S. taxes; and that some tax advisors frequently
stress tax planning with reference to tax havens.
In view of the theories and emotions surrounding these questions,
it is appropriate today to consider whether the emphasis on tax factors influencing investment decisions may not be exaggerated-to
consider whether in fact investment in this country or abroad, the
competitiveness of our exports, and the value of our currency are not
more dependent upon other policies and economic factors and
whether other tools are not more appropriate to solve perceived problems.
II. Is FOREIGN INVESTMENT GOOD OR BAD?
There can be little quarrel with the economic analysis that a
dollar invested in the United States produces benefits for this country
in the income and jobs that are generated and in taxes paid to the
United States. Taxes and wages are lost when the investment is made
abroad. Of less theoretical, but vital concern to Americans affected,
are those specific cases in which United States plants have been
closed and jobs have been eliminated while the enterprise through its
affiliates continues production abroad-in some instances for export
to the United States. It is also clear that since we do not generally
impose tax upon the undistributed income of a foreign subsidiary
which manufactures products abroad, that subsidiary may have a
more favorable current after tax rate on undistributed earnings than
it would have if located in the United States.
2. For example, the tax policies have been identified as involving "capital export"
neutrality (when the enterprise pays the same total rate of tax on foreign and domestic
profits), "capital-import" neutrality (when firms of all nationalities operating in a
country pay the same ultimate tax rate on their profits from operating in such
country), and "national" neutrality (where the return on capital which is shared between the national government and the taxpayer remains the same whether the capital
is located at home or abroad).
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Finally, there are arguments that encouraging U.S. private investment abroad also leads us to become involved in the political
affairs of other countries. If the U.S. Government encourages such
investment, the argument runs, then U.S. companies will expect the
U.S. Government to bail them out of political problems arising in
foreign countries.
There are counter arguments to each of the foregoing concerns.
One fundamental issue concerns the question of availability of capital. Much United States investment abroad is financed out of foreign
borrowings and retained earnings and does not represent a perpetual
outflow of capital from the United States. Indeed, for every year for
the past 24 years the return on U.S. capital invested abroad has
3
exceeded the direct investment outflow from the United States.
U.S. Direct Investment Abroad
[In billions of U.S. dollars]

1950 .......... ........... .....
19 51 .........................
1952 .................... .....
1953 ......... ........... .....
1954 .........................
1955 .......
............. .....
1956 ....... ..................
1957 ......... ................
1958 ................ .........
1959 ......... ....... ........ .
1960 ......... ........... .....
196 1 ......
...... ........ .....
1962 .........................
1963 ........................ .
196 4 ......... ....... ......
...
19 65 .........................
19 66 ............ ............ .
196 7 ...................... ...
1968 .........................
19 69 .........................
1970 ........................ .
19 71 .........................
19 72 .........................
1973 ............ .......... ...
1974 1 ........................

Direct
investment
outflow

Investment
income
receipts

0.6
.5
.9
.7
.7
.8
2.0
2.4
1.2
1.4
1.7
1.6
1.7
2.0
2.3
3.5
3.1
3.1
3.2
3.3
4.4
4.9
3.5
4.9
4.5

1.5
1.8
1.7
1.7
2.1
2.3
2.6
2.7
2.6
2.8
2.4
2.8
3.0
3.1
3.7
4.0
3.7
4.1
4.5
5.1
5.3
6.4
6.9
9.4
18.0

Estimate.

Source: International Economic Report of the President, transmitted to the Congress,
March 1975.
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Thus, foreign investment has been a net contributor to the United
States balance of payments position and a source of capital. While
capital may be short in a given period of time (in that its cost is
higher during that period than over the longer term) it is generally
possible for American enterprises to have both domestic and foreign
investment without foregoing profitable domestic investment. The
choice is not clearly either/or.
To the extent that a substantial portion of our exports are made
to foreign manufacturing affiliates, it is argued that in many instances we would not be exporting even components but for the existence of the foreign manufacturing investment that went abroad to
compete. It is very difficult to make conclusive judgments on this
question. In 1973, in a report to the Senate Finance Committee, the
Tariff Commission (now the International Trade Commission) reviewed competing claims concerning the effect of foreign investment
on domestic jobs and found that the question cannot be answered
conclusively. Under assumptions that the study determined to be the
most realistic of those considered, it found an overall gain of half a
million U.S. jobs.'
While we should be strongly in favor of investment in the United
States, we cannot assume that if we artificially deter American investment abroad (by punitive tax rates on foreign income, for instance) the potential American investor will necessarily invest his
funds in productive capacity within the United States. He may spend
his money in a manner that does not return it to domestic investment
channels, for example, simply by increasing imports. Nor in a world
of tariff and non-tariff barriers, high shipping costs and varying consumer preferences, should we assume that the alternative to foreign
investment is likely to be exports. The choice is more often between
making foreign investments and simply foregoing foreign business.
With regard to the argument that private investment abroad
entails U.S. interference in the political affairs of countries, it is
important to recognize that American companies operating abroad
are neither better nor worse than individuals or governments. Their
conduct is sometimes desirable and sometimes undesirable. Our recent involvement in Southeast Asia cannot be attributed to the influence of American private investment. Meanwhile, most developing
countries themselves still seek to attract the managerial and technological knowledge of the multinational enterprises.
Among intangible factors, the international scope of United
States industry makes it compete more effectively. In a competitive
4. SENATE FINANCE COMM., 93D CONG., 1ST SFSS., IMPLICATIONS OF MUiTINATIONAL
56, 669-72

FIRMS FOR WORLD TRADE AND INVESTMENT AND FOR U.S. TRADE AND LABOR

(Comm. Print. 1973).
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system, we should benefit as consumers.
The ability of U.S. and foreign multinational enterprises to bring
technology and consumer products to all areas of the world on competitive terms makes a positive contribution to world welfare and
stability.
To the extent the mobility of these enterprises is of concern, the
issue is broader than tax planning strategy. Indeed, the multinational
enterprises are probably subject to more government regulation as to
their tax liability than to other important aspects of international
investment, e. g., their employment policies. As for manipulation of
credits, income and deductions, including the use of tax havens, these
are the types of abuses that arise domestically as well, and can be
corrected by selective legislation and improved administration.
There are both advantages and disadvantages to foreign investment by United States based enterprises. On balance, foreign investment appears desirable. This is the stated position of the Administration and the implied position to date of the Congressional tax writing
committees. The arguments about our tax system are primarily over
what the proper balance should be in our tax structure with respect
to foreign and domestic investment. In the post-World War II period,
U.S. policy deliberately encouraged private U.S. investment abroad.
We are currently in a period in which the question is raised as to
whether we should make foreign investment less attractive.
Because the world contains a multiplicity of tax and accounting
systems, our tax structure simply cannot be neutral both at home and
abroad. If we tax all U.S. investment abroad currently at the U.S.
rate, we place some U.S. investment at a competitive disadvantage
relative to other investors in foreign countries, whether they be local
investors or investors from third countries. If we do not impose a full
U.S. tax on undistributed earnings, then some U.S. enterprises operating abroad will pay a lower current tax on their undistributed earnings than they would pay operating in the U.S.
What we should hope to produce are rules minimizing the making of investment decisions on the basis of tax factors, but designed
with the realization that there are practical limitations to any rules
or concepts and that there are such limitations in administering a tax
system that tries to fine-tune our tax laws with a hundred or more
other tax systems.

Im.

TAX STRUCTURE CONSIDERATIONS

A. The Foreign Tax Credit
The United States has unilaterally relieved international double
taxation as a tax credit country since 1918. The foreign tax credit is
now under strong attack by some as a giveaway of tax revenues or a
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gimmick for avoiding United States taxes.
Acceptance of the principle of the tax credit requires an understanding of the mechanics. The credit is available only where an
income tax has been paid somewhere. It operates mechanically to
give the taxpayer a credit against United States taxes on foreign
source income in the amount of the foreign taxes already imposed
upon that foreign source income, but not in excess of the U.S. tax on
it. Therefore, if the foreign income tax on corporate profits is less than
the United States tax, for example 30 percent, we will collect an
additional amount of $18 per $100 profit to bring the total tax collection up to 48 percent, the U.S. corporate tax rate. However, if the
foreign tax rate on foreign income is higher than the United States
tax we will give a credit up to our 48 percent tax on the foreign source
income. In that case we will not collect additional tax. The excess
credit does not reduce United States tax on United States source
income.
Repeal of the foreign tax credit (i.e., conversion to a deduction)
holds out the promise of vast tax revenues, perhaps as much as $8
billion. But this is a short term revenue gain since the consequences
of double taxation at rates in excess of 75 percent would quickly lead
to the selling off of foreign investment by U.S. owners5 and the consequent replacement of U.S. investment by foreign controlled multinationals.
The tax credit is not a perfect instrument. There are problems
concerning the application of the credit on a per-country or overall
foreign basis and the effect of losses incurred abroad which shall be
discussed later in contemplating possible changes in our tax structure.
B. Deferral
The other major consideration in foreign tax policy is so-called
"tax deferral," under which, as a general rule, the income of a corporation is not treated as having been received by the shareholders until
it is distributed to them. In the foreign area this means that, if a
United States investor establishes a foreign corporation, the United
States will generally not tax the income of the foreign corporation
5. For repeal of the foreign tax credit to be effective, it would be necessary to tax
undistributed earnings of foreign subsidiaries currently, since ending the credit would
otherwise discourage dividend repatriation. Outside of the mineral (including oil) and
banking industries, most U.S. companies invest abroad through foreign subsidiaries.
The double taxation impact of turning the tax credit into a deduction can be
illustrated by the example of $100 corporation income earned by a U.S. corporation in
Canada and taxed at a 50 percent rate in Canada. A deduction for the $50 Canadian
tax would leave the remaining $50 subject to tax at 48 percent in the United States.
The corporation would pay an additional $24 of U.S. tax for a total of $74 tax on each
$100 of corporate income. That would be an effective rate of 74 percent. If the remain-
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until that income is distributed as a dividend or until there is a sale
or disposition of the stock of the foreign corporation. We have exceptions to this rule in the case of foreign tax haven corporations used
as incorporated pocketbooks, as holding companies or as devices to
accumulate trans-shipment selling and service profits.
From a revenue standpoint, the tax deferral issue is less significant than the repeal of the foreign tax credit. In the case of deferral,
revenue estimates, following tax increases in the recent 1975 Tax Act,
suggest that the revenue gain from current taxation of the net earnings of U.S. controlled foreign subsidiaries would be under $365 million 6-less than 8/10 of one percent of estimated 1976 corporate U.S.
income tax revenues.'
While ending deferral would have a relatively small effect on
revenue, the fact that United States enterprises would be paying tax
on a different schedule from that of competing local industry in foreign countries would strongly affect specific investments. For example, the benefits of rapid depreciation deductions available in the
United Kingdom for U.S. taxpayers would be eliminated for U.S.
owned enterprises, which would pay U.S. taxes currently under a
different depreciation schedule. There would be dividend policy
problems in distributing income to meet increased tax payments by
United States shareholders in foreign joint ventures with minority
foreign interests. The distributions would attract foreign withholding
taxes that would reduce the U.S. revenue gain. There would also be
complications in countries having exchange controls and blocked
funds.
There is also a question of equity that is frequently ignored as to
whether in taxing undistributed income currently, foreign losses
would be netted with foreign income within the same controlled
group to determine how much tax was owed by the U.S. shareholders.
Indeed, rather than merely netting foreign losses against foreign gains
and imputing net income to U.S. shareholders, should not 6verall
foreign losses of foreign subsidiaries be deductible against U.S. source
ing $26 were taxed when distributed to shareholders, at say 35 percent, the result would
be an effective tax rate on distributed corporate income of 83 percent.
6. Estimated 1976 revenue gains from taxing the undistributed earnings of U.S.
controlled-foreign corporations may be in the neighborhood of $1.2 billion if losses of
controlled corporations are not netted against the profits. If the losses are netted
against the profits, the gain would be reduced to approximately $365 million (Preliminary Treasury estimates). (These figures assume that gross-up would be required for
dividends from less developed country corporations.) There is also the strong possibility that corporate operations would be re-arranged so that additional foreign taxes are
paid to foreign governments and the U.S. revenue gain reduced by the resulting foreign
tax credits.
7. Fiscal 1976 corporation income taxes were estimated at $47.7 billion. Budget
of the United States Government, fiscal year 1976, at 55.
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income, just as undistributed income would be taxable? This step,
however, would place the U.S. revenue base at a greater risk of adverse international economic developments. 8
Current taxation of undistributed earnings would impose a major
administrative burden on the I.R.S., since it would be required to
audit the returns of thousands of controlled foreign corporations on a
current basis.'
Finally, proposals to apply U.S. income taxes to the undistributed income of all U.S.-controlled foreign corporations would undoubtedly lead in time to greater efforts to avoid U.S. control status
("decontrol") and operate in joint venture form abroad. It would
simply not be possible to tax U.S. shareholders on the undistributed
earnings where there was no U.S. control. A significant number of
U.S. taxpayers would still have a share of foreign earnings not subject
to current U.S. tax.
Despite the practical problems involved, current taxation of undistributed earnings would make sense if a critical national interest
were involved.10 But does this issue in fact have the importance typically assigned to it? What weight should be given to the advantage
8. This would also be true if rather than imputing foreign earnings to the controlling U.S. shareholders, foreign corporations were required to file consolidated returns
with their U.S. parent (for example, to obtain a foreign tax credit).
9. Some of these same administrative problems exist today. The practical problem of audit and administration is a matter of degree. Thus, U.S. controlled foreign
subsidiaries are required to file annual information returns reporting income data
under U.S. tax accounting standards. When dividends are paid, the earnings computation and the foreign tax credits claimed must be reported according to U.S. rules.
There is, of course, some discretion as to the timing of such payments. It is not a
question of sustaining a U.S. tax liability under all circumstances each year.
The Subpart F tax haven rules impose a requirement that controlled foreign
corporations determine the relative percentage of Subpart F income they may have, if
any. The reduction of the de minimis safe-haven to permit only 10 percent of a controlled foreign corporation's gross income to be tax haven income makes this an important calculation and will increase the importance of precision in the calculations on
information returns by controlled foreign corporations. On the other hand, these
imputation-of-income rules involve certain defined categories of income. The rules
become a deterrent to the creation or operation of an organizational structure producing tax haven income and hence efforts will be made not to produce such income and
current U.S. taxation will not occur.
10. If foreign earnings were taxed currently, domestic exporters could not contend
that they are being discriminated against. From a structural standpoint also there are
some advantages in consolidation of foreign and domestic earnings. There would be
somewhat less pressure on our arm's-length allocation rules and the administration of
non-recognition provisions of the Code on transfers and reorganizations involving U.S.
shareholders and foreign corporations. On the other hand, the major problem of allocation of expenses between United States and foreign source income for tax credit purposes would remain.
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of deferral? As a practical matter, foreign tax rates are in fact quite
high in the aggregate, particularly where withholding taxes imposed
on dividend distributions are included."
Total U.S. revenue from taxing all foreign source income of U.S.
corporations in 1972 was approximately $1.2 billion when U.S. controlled foreign corporations distributed more than 50 percent of their
earnings. However, of the revenue collected, only an insignificant
part was received from U.S. tax imposed on foreign dividend distributions, since those distributions in most instances carried a credit for
foreign taxes already imposed equal to or in excess of the U.S. corporation's income tax. On total taxable earnings for that year of $14.5
billion, U.S. controlled foreign corporations paid some $6.7 billion in
foreign corporate income tax, for a 46 percent foreign income tax rate.
(The net U.S. tax revenue was basically on service fees, royalties,
interest payments and export income.)
Current taxation of all earnings would adversely affect some investment, such as tax-free U.S. controlled foreign flag shipping, and
would have some impact on specific operations, but would probably
not be a major deterrent to continued foreign investment. In this
sense, given the foreign tax credit, current taxation would not be the
end of the world for U.S. investment abroad, as some have tended to
suggest, particularly if it were done fairly. On the other hand, the
considerations enumerated should make us pause before we substaltially rearrange our tax rules in pursuit of a theoretical standard of
domestic neutrality and a kind of legislative tidiness.
C. Recent and Prospective Changes
The net balance of present tax rules and likely further changes
already represent a shift in favor of domestic rather than foreign
investment. If there is a "tilt" in our tax system it is in favor of
domestic investment. Our accelerated depreciation rules are more
favorable for domestic investment. The DISC reduces tax revenues
over $1 billion a year for exports if the production is located in the
United States, and the investment credit, as further increased this
year, reduces U.S. taxes in 1976 by some $8.7 billion for investment
in capital assets used in the United States. We should compare this
with the $365 million that would be obtained from changing our rules
to tax the undistributed earnings of U.S. controlled affiliates currently. Deferral is "permanent" for only a portion of foreign earnings
and is simply a postponement of U.S. taxation on the rest. This is
an imperfect offset to major incentives for investment in the U.S.
11. We should note, conversely, that there are many instances where our effective
domestic tax rates fall below 48 percent on domestic income.
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Indeed, when one looks at the specific reform provisions that are
being proposed, there is little neutrality in them-foreign losses of
subsidiaries would not be netted against taxable gains, the investment credit and ADR (accelerated depreciation rules) do not apply
to foreign investment, and consolidated returns for subsidiaries
generally are not allowed.
The preceding analysis does not mean, however, that some
changes are not overdue or that the foreign area should not be subject
to careful review. The Congress has already acted this year to tighten
substantially the tax haven rules first enacted in 1962 and to affect
significantly the taxation of foreign oil operations of United States
enterprises.
The Tax Reduction Act of 1975 eliminated a provision called
"minimum distributions" which permitted United States companies
with foreign operations to average their foreign tax rates to shelter a
portion of foreign source tax haven income from current taxation.
U.S. corporations were also entitled to have up to 30 percent of the
gross income of a controlled foreign subsidiary in the form of tax
haven income before any of the tax haven income became subject to
current U.S. taxation. This amount was reduced to a de minimis 10
percent of gross income. In addition, a minor provision permitting the
reinvestment of tax haven income in so called "less developed country corporations" was repealed and foreign profits of U.S. controlled
foreign flag shipping corporations, which are largely untaxed
throughout the world, will henceforth be treated as tax haven income
unless reinvested in shipping assets by the controlled foreign corporations.
In addition, the oil income of U.S. companies must now be computed on an overall tax credit limitation with a limitation on the
maximum amount of tax paid to foreign oil producing countries that
is currently creditable or will be so in future years. Rules were also
adopted to recapture overall foreign losses currently deducted against
United States income by reducing foreign tax credits claimed in later
years when the foreign operations become profitable.
D. What Might We Anticipate?
Foreign Tax Credit. One can anticipate that the tax credit will
be continued as a fundamental element of U.S. tax policy. It is possible, however, that its application may be limited in some respects
and the computation of the credit further fragmented among different types of income.'" The possibilities include:
12. Separate computations of the tax credit must now be made with respect to
interest income, DISC dividends, and income from mineral products subject to percentage depletion.
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(a) Review of the present per-country and overall methods of computing the tax credit limitation. Taxpayers today have a choice of treating their foreign income and tax credits on a country by country basis or
aggregating the total foreign income and credits. The former permits
undiluted tax credits for income from high tax countries while losses from
other countries may be deducted against U.S. source income. The overall
method permits the averaging effect of foreign taxes imposed in a country
with taxes higher than the U.S. with low taxed foreign income to shelter
the latter from U.S. taxation. The Congress may determine that taxpayers should have only one method of computing the tax, for example,
under the per-country limitation (perhaps with a recapture rule for foreign losses against United States income)" or an overall tax credit limitation. At one time, the tax credit was applied by computing the credit
under both methods and the taxpayer was limited to the method resulting in the lower credit under the two methods;
(b) a separate limitation of the credit for capital gains income, which
is taxed at a lower rate by the United States than ordinary income;
(c) a requirement that dividends from less developed country corporations be calculated in the same manner as those from developed countries. At the present time LDC dividends need not be grossed-up for U.S.
tax by the amount of foreign tax that was paid on them-an advantage
or not, depending on the foreign tax rate;
(d) a broadening of loss recapture rules applied this year to foreign
losses on oil exploration and drilling deductions taken against United
States income but followed by credits for foreign taxes on the profits in
subsequent years; heretofore the United States has borne the losses as a
reduction of U.S. income and foreign governments have collected all of
the tax when the operations become profitable.

Deferral. It is difficult to predict whether the deferral will be
modified. The substantial tightening of the Subpart F tax haven rules
this year, which will raise in excess of $225 million in 1976, may
satisfy the goal of increased tax equity. The fact remains, however,
that in a number of countries tax holidays are given for the establishment of manufacturing facilities. (Indeed this practice is followed
13. Adoption of an effective per-country limitation would require a significant
change in the United States source of income rules. As was recognized when the overall limitation was adopted in 1960, the averaging effect of foreign income and taxes
can be obtained by incorporating a foreign holding company into which all foreign
income flows. Under present rules, dividends paid by the holding company are considered to have their source in the country in which the foreign corporation is incorporated
and all foreign income taxes paid are considered to be income taxes imposed by that
country for tax credit purposes. Our source rules, including the passage of title test on
the sale of goods, would create complex tracing problems if taxpayers were required
to determine the country source of income for every transaction, particularly through
tiers of corporations. In theory, this problem now exists for a branch operation that is
on the per-country method, but most U.S. operations abroad are in subsidiaries. To
reduce the potential complexity, it might be necessary to adopt a rule that attributed
income to a foreign country if the income is "effectively connected" with an establishment in that country rather than depending on source rules. All of the consequences
of such a modification in the tax structure could not be clearly foreseen in advance.
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under the tax laws of some of our states and possessions.) Some
highly visible industries have moved into these areas combining tax
advantages and low labor costs. This remains the single most politically significant aspect of international corporate tax practices."
There are arguments that such incentives are not of major significance, that they phase themselves out over time, that the same result
can be obtained by non-tax measures, and that if U.S. companies do
not take advahtage of them, multinational enterprises of other nations will, both to compete in the domestic U.S. market and to displace U.S. exports. All of this may be more or less correct, but it is
difficult for a Congressman to explain to his constituents who have
just seen a typewriter or electronics plant close down in his district
while production is continued'in a foreign country.
Investment Incentives. There are understandable domestic policy reasons for a country to encourage captial investment in depressed
areas. Incentives to overcome the costs of doing business in such areas
may take the form of tax and non-tax measures. The United States
tax system generally permits U.S. companies to take advantage of
such provisions by incorporation abroad. In many instances the economic progress of these areas will ultimately result in the phasing out
of the development incentives. However, the existence in one country
of subsidies that may attract investment away from another country
is an inherently destabilizing element in relations among countries.
All capital exporting countries have some interest in the effect of such
incentives on their own industries and domestic jobs, and it would be
desirable to have some ground rules concerning such economic aids.
Indeed the Treaty of Rome calls for the development of standards for
14. In 1973 the Treasury Department proposed that termination of deferral might
be imposed (a) in those cases in which foreign countries provided tax holidays for
manufacturing and (b) in the case of United States controlled investments in countries
with low taxes where a substantial portion of the production of the foreign investment
was exported to the United States. The Treasury suggested that exceptions could be
made by treaty.
The 1973 Tariff Commission report to the Senate Finance Committee found that:
Although foreign direct investment by the "runaway firm" which is
interested principally in evading high production costs in the United
States, represents but a small proportion of total U.S. direct investment
overseas, it is common enough to have raised important social questions-especially for labor in the affected industries. Two essential characteristics delineate the kinds of industries in which developments of this
sort are likely to occur: (1) the industries are generally labor-intensive
ones in which labor costs represent a high proportion of the value of
output; and (2) foreign investment to serve foreign markets is minimal
(most or all of the output produced abroad being returned for sale in the
U.S. market).
See supra note 4, at 115-16.
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such economic aids within
the member countries of the European
5
Economic Community.1
Special Status Provisions. In addition to a continuing Congressional review of basic U.S. tax rules is the likelihood that certain
special provisions of the Internal Revenue Code will be repealed or
substantially modified. These areas include specifically:
(a) Western Hemisphere Trade Corporations.Domestic corporations
taxed at a lower rate than our ordinary corporate tax rate have arguably
reached the end of the road as part of our tax structure. Originally heavily
involved in foreign mining ventures and later including export operations,
Western Hemisphere Trade Corporations have been declining in use in
view of increased foreign tax rates, foreign expropriations and alternative
methods of doing business. At the end of the 1974 session, the Ways and
Means Committee reported a bill that would have phased them out.
(b) Sections 911 and 912. Section 911, which provides an earned
income exclusion for non-governmental employees overseas, and Section
912, which provides an exemption for certain government allowances
overseas. The bill reported out by the Ways and Means Committee in
1974 contained provisions that would phase out those sections. The
Treasury Department has been reviewing with the Joint Committee Staff
the question of whether there are special costs incurred in foreign employment that would merit statutory deductions if the Congress repeals these
exemptions.
(c) Less Developed Country Corporations. In addition to the likelihood that dividends from LDC corporations will bear a tax credit under
the same mechanics applicable to corporations operating in developed
countries, the statutory concept of distinguishing between developed and
less developed countries for limited tax purposes may be removed from
the Code.
(d) DISC. In the form of DISC (Domestic International Sales Corporation) provisions, the 1971 Revenue Act placed a substantial United
States export incentive in the Code. A flexible exchange rate system and

15. Article 92 of the Treaty of Rome states that any aid granted by a member of
the European Economic Community in any form which "distorts or threatens to distort
competition by favoring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods" is
incompatible with the Common Market "insofar as it affects trade between Member
States." Certain aids "may be" considered to be compatible with the Common Market. These include:
(a) aid intended to promote the economic development of regions
where the standard of living is abnormally low or where there is serious
underemployment;
(b) aid intended to promote the execution of an important project of
common European interest to remedy serious disturbance in the economy
of a Member State;
(c) aid intended to facilitate the development of certain economic
activities or of certain economic regions, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common
interest .. .;
(d) such other categories of aid as may be specified by the Council
by qualified majority decision on a proposal from the Commission.

14

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL. 5:1

a substantial realignment of the U.S. dollar reduce the need for special
export and balance of payments measures. A number of economists now
argue that DISC is no longer appropriate. (This analysis also applies to
weaken the argument that we should increase U.S. taxes on U.S.
a
investments abroad.)

There are a number of conflicting arguments and unsettled questions concerning export policies. Unlike the U.S., most foreign countries do not tax the profits of intermediary foreign selling subsidiaries."7 To what extent should DISC and foreign export laws be considered together as a subject for multilateral negotiations? Are we assured that a truly flexible exchange rate system will continue and
what assumptions should we make about its nature and effect?
To what extent does a continuously devaluing dollar result in a
worsening of our ability to import in real terms and permit other
countries to purchase U.S. goods at a bargain? It is argued that
optimum exports under a system of flexible exchange rates can be
16. If "floating," "flexible," or "managed" exchange rates mean that we need not
reduce our corporate tax burden on exports in order to be more competitive, the same
reasoning suggests that we need not increase our taxes on U.S. investment abroad,
since exchange equilibrium levels will adjust for any tax incentives given to encourage
investment exports.
17. Most developed countries do not tax the undistributed earnings of foreign
subsidiaries. Whether a corporation is foreign or not may depend upon the place of
incorporation (as in the United States) or upon the place where management and
control is exercised (the United Kingdom). Since enactment of the tax haven income
provisions of the Revenue Act of 1962 in the United States, only Canada and West
Germany have enacted provisions influenced by that legislation. Both are somewhat
less stringent. The Canadian legislation is limited to the current taxation of passive
investment income and royalties accumulated in a foreign holding company controlled
by Canadians. It does not apply to sales or service income. Canada in fact has very
liberal rules on the tax free return of income from a controlled foreign operating company. Originally by statute, and now by treaty, if more than 25 percent of the stock of
a foreign affiliate is Canadian owned then dividends distributed by the affiliate are
tax free in Canada without regard to taxes imposed in the foreign country.
In the case of Germany, provisions dealing with the current taxation of passive
income and of the income of foreign sales subsidiaries were introduced by the German
Government. Upon final enactment, the selling company income rules were made
applicable only in the case of sales of German exports (and not, for example, on sales
by a controlled foreign manufacturing subsidiary into another country through a tax
haven) and the rule was made applicable only where there was no economic substance
in the foreign selling subsidiary.
It is not unusual in some foreign tax systems (e.g., France) to exempt foreign
source income both in the form of dividends from foreign affiliates and also branch
profits (where there is a full cycle of economic activities in a foreign branch). While
suggestions are made from time to time that the United States should adopt an exemption system, it is highly unlikely that there would be acceptance in the Congress of
the principle that United States taxpayers could remain wholly tax free on their income merely by operating abroad, even though an exclusion of both foreign income and
deductions might not represent a significant revenue loss.
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obtained only if U.S. firms respond to changing rates. It is doubtful
that we export at such an optimum rate. It is estimated that 92
percent of U.S. manufacturing firms have no regular export business.
The United States exports about 14 percent of the total goods produced domestically as compared with 32 percent for France, 33.6
percent for Japan, 37.8 percent for Germany, 51.3 percent for the
United Kingdom, and 73.8 percent for Canada. Finally, as a matter
of tax structure, if deferral is retained for foreign manufacturing,
should export profits be taxed in all cases at the U.S. rate, or is this
again, like the termination of deferral, largely a question of conceptual tidiness?
IV. THE TAX/TRADE CONTEXT
The action taken to date and the most likely further changes do
not represent a massive assault on foreign investment or real impediments for conducting international business such as would occur from
repeal of the foreign tax credit. This being said, there remains genuine concern about the relative advantages of foreign and domestic
investment. What can we propose to meet those concerns?
I began by referring to the emphasis placed in recent years on our
tax structure as a factor in investment decisions. This approach is
found in a number of proposals, the best known being the
Burke/Hartke bill introduced in 1971. Although it dealt with trade
matters, it emphasized taxes as having an equal or greater impact
than trade rules on foreign investment. These views are echoed in
statements today.
This emphasis on the tax structure is not a reasonable perspective as evidenced by events. Changes in international monetary policy, eliminating the trading burden of an over-valued U.S. dollar,
have had a vastly greater effect on U.S. exports than could be obtained through changes in our tax laws. Two successive dollar devaluations made it possible for U.S. exports to share in a world-wide
explosion of trade. U.S. exports, which had been increasing for several years at about an 8 percent rate, increased 13 percent in 1972,
44 percent in 1973, and by 38 percent in 1974. Meanwhile U.S. enterprises no longer have the prospect of buying up foreign subsidiaries
with over-valued U.S. dollars.
United States strategy in maintaining domestic investment and
in exporting should rely primarily upon the development and improvement of international trading rules, and not upon unilateral
changes in our income tax laws. We have our own dumping and
countervailing duty laws, strengthened by the Trade Act of 1974, and
we are participants in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
and the multilateral trade negotiations that are now underway.
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With respect to imports, it is our trade laws and not our tax laws
that can provide an even-handed approach to products manufactured
outside the United States whether by U.S. controlled foreign corporations or by foreign controlled foreign corporations. Our countervailing
duty laws may be invoked to counter foreign tax incentives applied
to exports to the United States regardless of where manufactured or
by whom. The Trade Act of 1974 specifically directed the President
to seek reform of the GATT or to negotiate other agreements to promote a fair economic system, including "any revisions necessary to
define acceptable forms of subsidies to industries producing products
for export and to attract foreign investment." The right of access to
our markets should be developed as a bargaining element in securing
fair rules.
V. FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
The United States should continue to maintain an open investment policy. For the same reasons that we desire domestic investment by U.S. industry, we should maximize the ability of foreign
investors to place their investments in the United States. Shakespearian advice notwithstanding, we are both a lender and a borrower
and we should promote the development of and participate in international capital markets.
The tax element here is important, but again should be placed
in perspective. Whether we are talking about U.S. investors or foreign
investors, a stable climate for investment, including productive
labor, reasonable costs of capital, and moderate inflation rates is
ultimately more conducive than other factors to investment decisions
favoring the United States.
VI. TREATY POLICY
Implications for tax treaty policy flow from the foregoing analysis.
1. Artificial tax incentives for U.S. investments abroad are inappropriate by treaty. For a number of years, less developed countries
have sought to obtain tax concessions from the United States in the
form of "tax sparing," so that even if the foreign country does not
impose its income tax on local investment, the United States would
give a credit for the hypothetical foreign taxes that were "spared."
The Senate rejected such treaty provisions. Our present tax system
does permit U.S. companies to reinvest funds used in the business
abroad until they are repatriated. This prevents outright frustration
of limited tax incentives offered by developing countries while insuring ultimate U.S. taxation of distributed profits. If the Congress
moves to the general taxation of undistributed foreign earnings of
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U.S. controlled foreign corporations, consideration should be given to
authorizing negotiated treaty exceptions for developing countries.
Otherwise, given the tax benefits now available only for U.S. investment, we could create a tax disadvantage to investing and developing countries.
2. Our tax treaties must insist upon proper allocation of income
and expenses between U.S. companies and their foreign branches or
affiliates so that each country receives its fair share of revenues and
permits reasonable deductions.
3. We believe strongly in the treaty principle of nondiscrimination for foreign investors and for our investors abroad. This is of
particular importance in reviewing the changes in the laws of a number of developed countries to integrate their corporate and shareholder taxes. As a matter of long range policy we do not believe that
these provisions should be adopted to discriminate against foreign
investors.
4. In the past our tax treaties have tended to be negotiated apart
from other economic consultations and arrangements. Recently, however, there has been a trend toward establishing joint economic working groups with other countries, and our tax treaties should be seen
as merely one more tool in the context of overall cooperation in an
interdependent world. The tax treaties provide advantages for the
United States as well as for our trading partners in determining a fair
allocation of income and deductions and in providing a mechanism
to exchange information and to resolve the tax problems of enterprises conducting business in both countries. Our treaties should be
negotiated in the light of our desire to expand commerce with other
countries and to assure fair treatment on both sides.
VII. CONCLUSION
In the 1930's, during the economic depression in this country,
efforts were made to impose greater tax burdens on the foreign investments of U.S. companies."8 Then, as now, advantages through differ18. See e.g., SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMrrrEE ON WAYS AND MEANs, 73D CONG.,
2D SESS., PRELIMINARY REPORT RELATIVE To METHODS OF PREVENTING THE AVOIDANCE AND
EVASION OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE LAWS TOGErHER wrTr

SUGGESTIONS FOR THE SIMPLIFI-

CATION AND IMPROVEMENT THEREOF 9-10 (Comm. Print. 1933).

Your subcommittee recommends complete elimination of the provision of the present law (sec. 131, Revenue Act of 1932) allowing foreign
income taxes to be credited against federal income tax. The present provision discriminates in favor of American citizens and domestic corporations doing business abroad as compared with those doing business in this
country.

The recommendation was opposed by then Acting Treasury Secretary Morgenthau. STATEMENT OF THE ACTING SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY REGARDING THE PRELIMINARY REPORT OF A SUBCOMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS,

at 11-12 (1933).
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ences in U.S. and foreign tax structures were cited as an encouragement to foreign investment. These issues were heatedly debated in
1961 and 1962, resulting in the compromise foreign tax haven provisions of the Revenue Act of 1962, recently tightened by the 1975 tax
legislation. The implications of this history seem to me relatively
clear. Going beyond our unilateral review of the U.S. tax structure,
we must encourage a greater focus by the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) and more broadly based organizations such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) on the harmonization of general principles applicable to the
granting of tax incentives to attract investment and to encourage
exports. The alternative to international standards of conduct is to
witness continued efforts, varying with transitory economic cycles, by
all countries, including the United States, to alter their income tax
laws to encourage exports, to induce domestic investment by foreigners, or to restrain foreign investment by their nationals.

